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ABSTRACT
Financial economists in recent years have closely examined and intensely debated the
performance of initial public offerings using data after the formation of NASDAQ.  The paper seeks to
shed light on this controversy by undertaking a large, out-of-sample study: we examine the performance
for up to five years after listing of nearly 3,661 initial public offerings in the United States from 1935 to
1972.  The sample displays some evidence of underperformance when event-time buy-and-hold abnormal
returns are used.  The underperformance disappears, however, when cumulative abnormal returns are
utilized.  A calendar-time analysis also shows that over the entire sample period ￿ i.e., from 1935 to 1976
￿ IPOs return as much as the market.  Finally, the intercepts in CAPM and Fama-French three-factor
regressions are insignificantly different from zero, suggesting no abnormal performance.
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Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) document severe underperformance of 
initial public offerings (IPOs) during the past twenty years.  In discussing these results, they 
suggest that investors may systematically be too optimistic about the prospects of firms that are 
issuing equity for the first time.  Their results have inspired countless articles in the popular press 
about the danger of investing in IPOs, as well as academic research that has shown that 
underperformance extends to other countries as well as to seasoned equity offerings.   
 
The results concerning IPO performance, however, are not uncontroversial.  Brav and 
Gompers (1997) show that firms that go public do not perform worse than benchmarks matched 
on the basis of size and book-to-market ratios.  In addition, they show that value weighting IPO 
returns dramatically reduces the measured underperformance.  Finally, they argue that weighting 
returns in event time by the number of IPOs may overstate underperformance. 
 
The debate about the underperformance of IPOs, however, may not easily be answered 
without out-of-sample tests. Most studies on the underperformance of IPOs have examined the 
same post-NASDAQ time period.  Data from non-U.S. markets is not conclusive because of the 
shorter time periods employed and the cross sectional correlation between returns of IPOs in the 
U.S. and the return of IPOs in these other markets.  Common economic shocks or common 
movements in fads and sentiment potentially drive these correlations. 
 
In this paper we undertake a large, out-of-sample investigation of IPO underperformance.  
In particular, we gather information on the universe of firm-commitment IPOs in the United States from 1935 to 1972 and measure their returns for up to five years after listing.  In order to 
compile this information, we hand-collected over one hundred and fifty thousand observations 
from such publications as the Bank and Quotation Record, the S&P Dividend Guide, and the 
various Moody’s manuals.  This is the first large-scale examination of IPO returns prior to the 
creation of the NASDAQ exchange, and more than doubles the period over which the 
performance of U.S. IPOs can be observed.  As such, it represents a potentially powerful sample 
to examine the performance of equity issuers.  
 
The results demonstrate that the performance of IPOs from 1935 to 1972 depends upon 
the method of return measurement used.  While the sample shows underperformance when 
performance is measured using value-weighted event-time buy-and-hold abnormal returns, this 
underperformance disappears when either equal-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns or 
cumulative abnormal returns are utilized.  The calendar-time analysis shows that over the entire 
sample period—i.e., from 1935 to 1976—IPOs return as much as the market.  Finally, in simple 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Fama-French three-factor regressions, the intercepts 
are insignificantly different from zero or even significantly positive.  The difference between the 
event-time and calendar-time results stems from the clustering of IPOs in periods immediately 
preceding poor IPO performance: IPOs and similar size and book-to-market stocks have lower 
returns after periods with heavy IPO issue volume, though the effects are not statistically 
significant. 
 
The results raise questions concerning the interpretation of the underpeformance of IPOs 
seen in the NASDAQ era.  The long-run performance of pre-NASDAQ IPOs depends 
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rule out the possibility of more broad-based sentiment-driven mispricing, they provide little 
support for a distinct IPO effect. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the relevant earlier 
literature.  The data are described in Section III.  The empirical analysis is discussed in Section 
IV.  Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. Literature  review 
II.A.  Behavioral finance and IPOs 
Behavioral economists have demonstrated that individuals often violate Bayes' Rule and 
rational choice theories when making decisions under uncertainty in experimental settings 
(Kahneman and Tversky (1982)).  In a similar vein, financial economists have also discovered 
long-run pricing anomalies that have been attributed to investor sentiment.  Behavioral theories 
posit that investors give too much weight to recent results and trends.  Eventually, over-
optimistic investors are disappointed and subsequent returns decline. 
 
To cite several important illustrations, DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) demonstrate that 
buying past losers and selling past winners is a profitable trading strategy.  Risk, as measured by 
beta or the standard deviation of stock returns, does not seem to explain the results.  Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) show that many "value" strategies also seem to exhibit abnormally 
high returns.  These authors form portfolios based on earnings-to-price ratios, sales growth, 
earnings growth, or cash flow-to-price and find that "value" stocks outperform "glamour" stocks 
  3without appreciably affecting risk.  Similarly, La Porta (1996) shows that a strategy of selling 
stocks with high forecasted earnings growth and buying companies with low projected earnings 
growth produces excess returns.  These papers imply that investors are too optimistic about 
stocks that have had good performance in the recent past and too pessimistic about stocks that 
have performed poorly. 
 
In addition to trading strategies based on accounting or stock market performance, 
researchers have examined financing events as sources of potential trading strategies.   
Theoretical work by Ross (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that the choice of 
financing strategy can send a signal to the market about firm valuation.  Initial studies (e.g., 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Asquith and Mullins (1986)) focused on the market reaction 
around the time that equity or debt issues were announced.  These works implicitly assumed that 
all information implied by the financing choice was fully and immediately incorporated into the 
company's stock price.  The literature on long-run abnormal performance, on the other hand, 
examines the possibility that the market underreacts to the informational content of the financing 
event. 
 
In particular, Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that nominal five-year 
buy-and-hold returns are 50% lower for recent IPOs (which earned 16%) than they are for 
comparable size-matched firms (which earned 66%).  Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) show that 
IPO underperformance is positively related to the size of discretionary accruals in the fiscal year 
of the IPO.  Larger accruals in the IPO year are associated with more negative performance.  
  4Teoh, et al. believe that the level of discretionary accruals is a proxy for earnings management 
and that the boosted earnings systematically fool investors. 
 
On the other hand, papers by Brav and Gompers (1997) and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers 
(2000) show that equity-issuing firms, whether IPO or seasoned equity offering issuers, appear to 
perform like other long-standing public companies.  In particular, Brav and Gompers show that 
even though the sample of IPOs underperforms broad market benchmarks, IPOs from 1975 to 
1992 have five-year returns that are similar to size and book-to-market matched benchmarks.  
Similarly, value weighting IPO returns substantially reduces measured underperformance 
relative to all benchmarks. 
 
II.B.  Performance measurement 
  Another area of relevant research considers the choice of metric to measure firms’ 
performance.  Several recent papers inform our choice of tests of long-horizon abnormal 
performance.  Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
(1999) provide thorough evidence about various methods of measuring abnormal performance.   
These papers do not find that one method is always preferred. 
 
  Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) provide an additional assessment regarding 
the merits of such methodologies.  They argue that abnormal performance measures such as 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and time-series regressions are less likely to yield spurious 
rejections of market efficiency than methodologies that calculate buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) by 
compounding single period returns at a monthly frequency.  First, the buy-and-hold method can 
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compounding single-period returns. Second, distributional properties and test statistics for 
cumulative abnormal returns are better understood.   
 
  These problems can be illustrated by considering a firm that had a return of –50% in the first 
year, and +10% in the second and third years, while the market benchmark was flat during the first 
year and also returned +10% during the second and third years.  A buy-and-hold calculation will 
suggest that the company underperforms the index by over 60% (a return of -39.5% for the 
company vs. that of 21% for the market), while the CARs will differ only by 50%.  As Brav, Geczy, 
and Gompers (2000) point out, the choice of CARs or BHARs largely depends upon the implicit 





One of the main barriers to research in this area is the identification and characterization 
of IPOs prior to 1973.  This section describes the procedures that we followed. 
 
III.A.  Identifying the Sample 
While researchers examining IPOs undertaken in 1973 and thereafter can identify 
offerings through electronic databases and filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
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1Among the concerns with the use of CARs is the methodology’s tendency to misrepresent 
performance when returns are highly volatile.  Consider a case where a firm had returns of –50% 
in the first period and +100% in the second period while the benchmark was flat in both periods.  
A buy-and-hold calculation would suggest that the excess return was zero, while the CARs 
would be computed to be +50%.   Commission (SEC), research into earlier periods is more challenging.  The Securities Data 
Company’s Corporate New Issues database only extends back to 1970, and the detail of the 
information collected is scanty in earlier years.  SEC filings prior to 1973 were not distributed by 
Disclosure and are stored in at least two poorly indexed and documented government archives. 
 
Thus, we rely on a variety of secondary sources to identify the IPOs.  We will review 
these in chronological order. For the period between July 1934 (the effective date of the 
Securities Act of 1933) and December 1949, we rely on the compilation, Issuer Summaries 
(Dean, Piel, and Steyer (1951)).  This two-volume set was prepared by the defense counsel for 
the 17 investment banks in the antitrust case United States v. Henry Morgan, et al.
2  As part of 
this litigation, in which the government alleged that the banks had conspired to monopolize 
underwriting activities, the banks compiled a listing of all U.S. security issues during this period.  
We only include underwritten IPOs of common stock that were executed with the services of an 
investment banker and were fully registered with the SEC, and where there was at least some 
primary component to the offering.
3 
 
For the period between 1950 and 1960, we employed the compilation Corporate 
Financing (Dealers’ Digest Publishing Company (1961)), which was prepared by the publisher 
of the magazine Investment Dealers’ Digest.  The information from this volume was compiled 
from the semi-annual summaries of activity printed in that magazine.  The editors explicitly 
                                                           
2118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
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3The purely secondary IPOs during this period were almost entirely of the type known as 
“special offerings,” where trading was limited to the members of the exchange on which it was 
listed.  These were not strictly comparable to the other offerings, and hence were deleted from 
the sample. modeled their compilation after the earlier Issuer Summaries.  One exception was in its coverage.  
The volume eliminated offerings that were (i) not underwritten, (ii) unregistered, (iii) filed but 
not fully registered with the SEC (during this period, the issuers of offerings under $300,000 
could instead simply file a letter of notification with the SEC), or (iv) certain classes of 
secondary offerings that were not freely tradable after the offering.  Since we had eliminated 
similar offerings from the offerings reported in Issuer Summaries, these deletions produce 
minimal biases.  We again only included the IPOs of common stock in our sample. 
 
Offerings in the period from 1960 through 1969 were identified from the volume, A 
Decade of Corporate and International Finance: 1960-1969 (Hillstrom and King (1970)).  This 
volume was also compiled from the records of Investment Dealers’ Digest in conjunction with 
the Investment Bankers Association of America (the predecessor to the Securities Industry 
Association).  The volume did not include non-registered offerings, those under $300,000 
(entitled to abbreviated registration under Regulation A), or non-underwritten offerings. We 
again only included the IPOs of common stock in our sample.
4 
 
The final period for which data was compiled was the years 1970 through 1972.  In these 
years the records of Investment Dealers’ Digest were computerized.  These are now available 
through Securities Data Company (SDC), which acquired the magazine’s database business in 
1992.  The criteria for the inclusion of offerings in the SDC compilation appear identical to those 
employed by Investment Dealers’ Digest, reflecting the common origin of this data source. We 
                                                           
4This data set was at one point available in electronic form as well (Ibbotson (1975), Ibbotson 
and Jaffe (1975)), but this file has now apparently been lost. 
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 again only included the IPOs of common stock in our sample.  Unfortunately, the records 
available through SDC are not complete.  Thus, we hand-collected the missing information from 
the “New Market Names” section of the Investment Dealers’ Digest, which summarized IPOs on 
a monthly or bi-monthly basis during this period.  
 
Three methodological issues deserve notice.  One complication was introduced by the 
fact that the volumes for the period 1934 through 1959 did not clearly distinguish between IPOs 
and seasoned equity offerings.  In order to determine this, we checked the issues of Moody’s and 
the Bank and Quotation Record to determine if the firm had been publicly traded before the 
offering.  If so, we eliminated it as a possible IPO. 
 
Firms that are recorded as having gone public, but never appeared in the compilation of 
stock data discussed below, introduced a second complication.  In many cases, it appears that the 
compilations (particularly during the 1930s and 1940s) included offerings that were subsequently 
withdrawn for lack of investor interest.  If the firm did not appear in the Bank and Quotation 
Record within twelve months of the reported IPO date, we deleted it from the sample.  
 
Finally, assessing the completeness of the sample is exceedingly difficult.  In particular, 
while the SEC produced at least three compilations of IPO activity during this period (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (1941), U.S. Congress (1963), U.S. Small Business 
Administration (1980)), their compilations are quite different in nature.  In particular, most of the 
tabulations are of all unseasoned firms to file with the SEC, whether the offering was 
  9underwritten or not.  The tabulations include many private placements and other offerings that 
were not fully registered with the SEC. 
 
Table I summarizes the final sample of IPOs.  There are a total of 3,661 offerings in the 
sample.  The distribution over time is highly uneven.  There is little IPO activity during the Great 
Depression and World War II.  The number of offerings surged in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
and again in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The average IPO firm had a market value at the first 
available trading price of $89.1 million in constant 1999 dollars (using the Consumer Price Index 
as a deflator), while the median firm had a market capitalization of $31.7 million.  Much like the 
recent samples of IPOs, the IPOs from 1935-1972 also had relatively low book-to-market ratios.  
The mean (median) book-to-market ratio in our sample is 0.443 (0.305), indicating that the firms 
are primarily growth companies. 
 
III.B.  Identifying the Stock Returns 
  For each IPO, we sought to compute the five-year calendar and anniversary return.  In 
order to do so, we needed to obtain eleven stock prices.  These included the stock price 
immediately after the offering, on the five anniversaries of the offering, and at the end of the five 
Decembers after the offering. 
  
  The primary source of this information was the Bank and Quotation Record, a specialized 
publication of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
5  This monthly periodical reports the 
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5This was the same source used by Jarrell (1981) and Simon (1989) who examined the returns of 
IPOs and seasoned offerings between 1926 and 1940.  In each case, the sample consisted of less 
than 100 IPOs.  This source was also used for at least three studies of returns during the 1960s.  prices of a wide array of securities at the close of the previous month.  The Bank and Quotation 
Record also indicates stock splits, name changes, and delistings, but its coverage does not appear 
to be comprehensive.   
 
The use of the Bank and Quotation Record poses a variety of issues.  First, not all 
securities appear in the listing immediately after their reported IPO date.  We treat the first 
observation as the price immediately after the IPO, as long as it appears within twelve months of 
the reported IPO date.  (If it does not appear within twelve months, we do not include the IPO in 
the sample, as discussed above.)  In some cases, a stock price does not appear in a given 
anniversary month or December, but does so in the month immediately before and after the 
offering.  In this case, we will use the average of the two prices.  Occasionally, a company will 
disappear for an extended period (e.g., one year) and then reappear.  In the case of absences of 
longer than three months, we check with the Wall Street Journal Index and Moody’s guides to 
insure that this is not a new firm using the same name as an acquired or delisted firm.   
 
Due to the poor coverage of stock splits and delistings by the Bank and Quotation 
Record, as well as its failure to record dividends, we supplemented its information with the 
Standard & Poors' Dividend Record.  We record from this volume all cash or stock dividends 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ibbotson (1975) examined returns from 120 IPOs between 1960 and 1969.  Logue (1973) 
examined the returns of 250 IPOs issued between 1965 and 1969.  McDonald and Fisher (1972) 
examined 142 IPOs issued in 1969.  This may have also been the source of the data used by 
Stigler (1964), who examines the wealth relatives of several hundred IPOs (but does not compute 




 paid by the firm through its fifth anniversary.  This compilation also has a much more 
comprehensive coverage of name changes, acquisitions, stock splits, and so forth.   
 
Finally, for some of the firms that went public in our sample in 1968 and thereafter, we 
are able to obtain some returns data for the final observations from the tapes of the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP).   
 
III.C.  Supplemental Information 
A variety of additional data was collected about the firms from two data sources.  The 
first of these were the various Moody’s manuals, including the industrial, over-the-counter and 
utility editions.  We determined from this source the book value of the common stock as well as 
the number of shares outstanding, using the edition published immediately after the IPO.   
Because of the difficulty of obtaining information on the market value of preferred stock in the 
early years, we computed the market and book value of the common stock only. In computing 
book equity, we included all forms of retained earnings, surplus, paid-in capital associated with 
common stock, and minority interests.  We did not include reserves, contributions in aid, and 
other “liability-like” balance sheet entries.  The market value was computed as the product of the 
number of shares of common stock outstanding after the IPO (or at the first period after the 
offering where this information could be ascertained from Moody’s) and the first price 
observation of the common stock in the Bank and Quotation Record after the IPO. 
 
We also checked firms that disappeared from the Bank and Quotation Record using the 
Wall Street Journal Index and Moody’s guides.  In particular, we sought to discern whether the 
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that case).  While in many cases, we were unable to discern what happened to the firms from 
these sources, the unidentified disappeared firms were on average quite small.  For these low 
priced firms that disappear, we assume a return of –100% in the delisting year.  We explore the 
impact of treating the disappeared firms in different ways, but find the changes have a minimal 
impact on the results. 
 
  We classified the IPOs into quintiles based on their market capitalization and book-to-
market ratio.  We utilize the quintiles created by Davis, Fama, and French (2000).  To get size 
breakpoints, firms are grouped on the basis of market capitalization at the beginning of a 
particular trading month.  As in earlier research, the breakpoints are computed using only stocks 
trading on major exchanges: in this instance, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  Hence, 
Davis, Fama, and French allocate an equal number of NYSE stocks to one of five size quintiles.  
The size quintile breakpoints for each month are recorded.  Similarly, each June the ratio of book 
equity to market equity is calculated for each firm on the NYSE.  An equal number of firms is 
allocated to one of five book-to-market quintiles.  The annual book-to-market breakpoints are 
then intersected with the size breakpoints to create twenty-five size and book-to-market 
portfolios. 
 
  Panel A of Table II summarizes the distribution of firms.  Not surprisingly, more than 
one-half of the IPO sample falls into the (1,1) portfolio, which is the collection of the smallest 
firms with the lowest book-to-market ratio.  Overall, almost 90% of our IPOs are in the smallest 
size quintile of stocks when breakpoints are based on NYSE stocks.  Less than 2% of our firms 
  13are in the largest two size quintiles.  Similarly, 61% of our firms are in the lowest book-to-
market quintile.  In addition, Panels B and C present the average size and book-to-market ratios 
for the IPOs in each of the twenty five size and book-to-market portfolios. 
 
IV. Results 
IV.A. Event-Time Returns 
  In this section we present analyses of the returns of IPOs in event time; that is, measuring 
performance relative to the date of the IPO or the first stock price observation.  Figure 1 provides 
an initial look at the results.  We compute the abnormal return on the IPO in each year by 
subtracting the return (including any dividends) from one of two benchmarks: the CRSP value-
weighted index and the return of the portfolio of firms with the same size and book-to-market 
ratio as the IPO.  The data shows that abnormal returns are quite high in the first year relative to 
both benchmarks.  Abnormal returns relative to the CRSP value-weighted index are negative in 
years two and three, but are positive in both years four and five.  The abnormal returns relative to 
matched size and book-to-market portfolios follow a somewhat different pattern. Abnormal 
returns are high in the first year, negative in years two, three, and five, but positive in year four.  
The initial picture is one that does not generally suggest persistent and strong underperformance.  
Year-to-year performance appears to be quite random, as is suggested by Fama (1998). 
 
  In Table III, we compute the three- and five-year buy-and-hold return of the IPOs by 
compounding the annual return on the issuer firm (once again including any dividends).  In 
Panels A and B, the returns are calculated for three and five years.  If the IPO is acquired or 
delisted before the third or fifth anniversary, both the IPO returns and benchmark/market returns 
  14are set to zero in subsequent years.  In Panels C and D, if the IPO firm is acquired or delisted 
before the third or fifth anniversary, we splice in the return of the IPO firm’s matched size and 
book-to-market benchmark in subsequent years.   
 
  The results in Panels A and B show that the returns to IPOs severely underperform the 
market on a buy-and-hold return basis.  IPOs return 8.5% over three years and only 11.4% over 
five years.  The underperformance relative to the CRSP value-weighted index is –16.7% after 
three years and -21% after five years. These patterns largely match the results found in the data 
after 1972.   
 
  In the last two columns of Table III, we compute the value-weighted returns over three- 
and five-year periods.  (We use the market capitalization of the firm as weights, computed using 
the first market price found in the Bank and Quotation Record.)  Unlike the post-1972 period, 
performance is even worse for the larger IPOs.  Returns drop to 6.3% after three years and 11% 
after five years.  Underperformance relative to the CRSP value-weighted index is –20% after 
three years and –35% after five years.  (See below for a discussion of the statistical significance 
of the results.) 
 
  Brav and Gompers (1997) show that the underperformance of IPOs after 1972 is 
eliminated when firms are matched to portfolios based on size and book-to-market.  In our 
sample of IPOs, we find mixed evidence of a similar reduction in underperformance.   
Underperformance after three years is smaller (-8.4%), but underperformance after five years is 
larger, -33%, when IPO returns are adjusted for size and book-to-market benchmark returns.  
  15This indicates that the returns of IPO firms initially mimic the poor performance of small, low 
book-to-market firms, but perform worse over longer time horizons (see Figure 1).  The matched 
size and book-to-market portfolios in our sample are relatively free from IPO firms because 
Davis, Fama, and French only allocate NYSE firms to the benchmark portfolios.  It was very rare 
for firms that had recently gone public to list on the NYSE during these years. 
 
  While the buy-and-hold abnormal returns in Table III are quite negative, suggesting 
severe IPO underperformance, conducting standard t-test measurements for statistical 
significance can produce misleading inferences.  Consistent with the findings of Barber and 
Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997), the buy-and-hold equal-weighted series exhibits 
large positive skewness, yielding misspecified t-statistics.  In contrast, the five-year value-
weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns demonstrate negative skewness.  
 
  Following Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), we employ a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted 
t-statistic to correct the negatively biased t-statistics.  We draw 5,000 resamples of size n (in this 
case, n=100), with replacement, from each return series and calculate a skewness-adjusted t-
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  Critical values for skewness-adjusted t-statistics are then calculated based on the 
resamples; these values represent the cutoffs at which a null hypothesis that average buy-and-
hold returns are zero can be rejected for a give significance level.  These critical values are 
obtained by solving: 
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The skewness-adjusted t-statistic calculated for each of the actual buy-and-hold return series is 
then compared to these bootstrapped critical values to determine whether any underperformance 
(or overperformance) is found to exist. 
 
  While Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) and Sutton (1993) find these bootstrapped critical 
values preferable to the standard normal distribution criterion, the effect in our study is minimal.  
For the equal-weighted buy-and-hold returns, applying the correction above produces 
transformed t-statistics that are insignificant using either the bootstrapped or normal critical 
values.  Conversely, the five-year value-weighted returns are always significant at the one 
percent level, irrespective of the cut-off used.  The only difference arises for the three-year 
value-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal IPO returns relative to the CRSP value-weighted index: 
using the bootstrapped critical values reduces significance from the one percent to the five 
percent level. 
 
  17  The results in Panel C and D are consistent with the earlier results.  Splicing in the size 
and book-to-market benchmark returns leave underperformance relative to the CRSP value-
weighted index quite significant.  Again, performance of the IPO portfolio is quite similar to that 
of the size and book-to-market matched firms for the three-year horizon, but not for the five-year 
time period.  The effect of splicing in missing observations with the benchmark return is to 
increase somewhat the three-year returns, while increasing the five-year returns by a large 
amount. 
 
  In Table IV, we calculate abnormal performance using the cumulative abnormal return 
methodology.  As Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue, CARs may be a better, less 
biased method to calculate long-horizon returns because it eliminates the compounding effect of a 
single year’s poor performance.  Abnormal returns are calculated by subtracting benchmark returns 
from the IPO firm’s return.  We calculate CARs by summing annual abnormal returns over three or 
five years.  In Panels A and B, returns are calculated for three and five years, with the IPO returns 
and benchmark/market returns set to zero if the firm is acquired or delisted.  In Panels C and D, 
we again splice in the return of the firm’s matched size and book-to-market benchmark if the 
firm delists prior to its third or fifth anniversary.   
 
  Once performance is measured using CARs, we get a different picture of long-run 
performance.  Half of the equal-weighted CARs in Panels A and B are actually positive.  Value 
weighting tends to increase the returns somewhat.  Nevertheless, none of the CARs are 
statistically different from zero.  In Panels C and D, in which we splice size and book-to-market 
benchmark returns for the IPO firm returns upon a delisting, the CARs are again insignificantly 
  18different from zero.  It appears, therefore, that this correction has only a modest effect, whether 
on the buy-and-hold abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of the IPO firms. 
 
  Table V highlights the extent to which the event-time returns vary across time.  The five-
year returns are calculated for all firms going public in a given year.  These tables splice in the 
benchmark returns for firms that are acquired or delisted before the end of the period, as is done 
in Panels C and D of Tables III and IV.  The results show that the cohorts with the greatest 
number of offerings, from 1968 to 1972, have strongly negative returns.  This accounts for the 
underperformance of IPOs when measured in event time.  Half of our IPOs occur between 1968 
and 1972. Because of the multiplicative effect discussed in Section II, the results tend to be more 
volatile when buy-and-hold returns are calculated: the “good” cohorts have more positive returns 
than those computed using CARs, and the poor ones have more negative ones.   
 
IV.B. Calendar-Time Returns 
  In order to address potential problems with event-time returns, we examine calendar-time 
returns for our sample of IPO firms.  In order to examine the calendar-time performance, we 
calculate returns for all firms that were already public at the beginning of the year and do not 
celebrate the fifth anniversary of their IPO by the end of the year.  Returns are again equal- and 
value-weighted.   
 
  In Figure 2, we compare the calendar-time performance of the IPO portfolio relative to 
both the CRSP value-weighted index and the matched size and book-to-market benchmarks.  
These reference portfolios are presented on both an equal- and value-weighted basis.  We see 
  19from the results that the IPO firms appear to have time-series returns that are not strikingly 
different from the market.  The equal-weighted IPOs perform substantially better than the CRSP 
value-weighted index and matched size and book-to-market benchmarks.  The value-weighted 
IPOs, however, underperform all three benchmarks.  Unlike in the NASDAQ era, during these 
years large IPOs actually performed worse than small offerings. 
 
Table VI computes the returns of the IPO portfolios in each calendar year.  For each year, 
we compute the equal- and value-weighted returns for all IPOs in the sample that have gone 
public in the past five years, and compare it to various market benchmarks.  The average return 
using three of the four approaches is positive.  (Again, value weighting the IPOs reduces the 
level of returns.)  It is important to note the implications of treating each calendar year equally: 
during the early and mid 1970s, when the most IPOs are in the sample, the returns were quite 
negative (at least relative to the CRSP value-weighted index).   
 
We also report the return of the (1,1) portfolio
6 net of the CRSP value-weighted index.  
This is highly correlated with the IPO returns.  For instance, the correlation coefficient of the 
excess return of the (1,1) portfolio over the CRSP value-weighted index and the excess return of 
the value-weighted IPO return series (net of the CRSP value-weighted index) is 0.689 (with a p-
value of .000).    
   
                                                           
6As noted above, the (1,1) portfolio contains those firms that are in the smallest size quintile and 
the smallest book-to-market quintile based on NYSE breakpoints. 
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 The negative correlation between IPO volume and IPO returns is highlighted in Table 
VII.  The correlation between the size of the portfolio (the volume of IPOs in the past five years, 
less any delistings) and the annual returns net of the CRSP value-weighted index is about –0.1, 
though not statistically significant.  Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that managers at IPO firms 
time market-wide mispricing, e.g., managers choose to issue when similar firms are severely 
overvalued.  As such, periods following heavy IPO volumes are likely to be followed by 
particularly poor IPO performance and by particularly poor returns of the (1,1) portfolio.  While 
the pattern of the results is consistent with their suggestions, the correlation is not statistically 
significant and appears to be driven by a few outliers. 
 
IV.C. CAPM and Fama-French Three-Factor Regressions 
If IPOs underperform on a risk-adjusted basis, portfolios of IPOs should consistently 
underperform relative to an explicit asset pricing model.  Recent work by Fama and French 
(1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) indicates that a three-factor model may explain the cross section of 
stock returns.  Their three factors are RMRF, which is the excess return on the value-weighted 
market portfolio; SMB, the return on a zero investment portfolio formed by subtracting the 
return on a large firm portfolio from the return on a small firm portfolio; and HML, the return on 
a zero investment portfolio calculated as the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks 
minus the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks.
    
 
As in Fama and French’s work, we use the intercept from time-series regressions as an 
indicator of risk-adjusted performance of the pre-NASDAQ IPOs.  The intercepts in these 
regressions have an interpretation analogous to Jensen's alpha in the CAPM framework.  This 
  21approach has the added benefit that we can make statistical inferences given the assumption of 
multivariate normality of the residuals.   
 
This approach has a disadvantage, though: it weights each month equally in minimizing 
the sum of squares.  If underperformance is correlated with the number of IPOs in our portfolios, 
the Fama-French results will reduce the measured underperformance.  We will address this 
deficiency by also estimating returns weighted by the square root of the number of IPOs in the 
portfolio. 
 
  Table VIII presents the three-factor time-series regression results.  Annual returns of the 
IPO portfolio returns are regressed on either RMRF for CAPM analysis or on RMRF, SMB, and 
HML for the Fama-French three-factor analysis.  The intercepts in the simple CAPM are 
insignificantly different from zero.  In the equal-weighted Fama-French three-factor regression, 
it is actually positive and significant at the one-percent confidence level.  When the IPOs are 
value weighted, the performance is again poorer: the intercept is still positive but insignificant.  
Overall, these results confirm the time-series analysis above.  IPOs do not appear to 
underperform on a calendar-time basis.  
 
  Panel B presents the Fama-French regressions weighted by the square root of the number 
of firms in the IPO portfolio in each year.  Once again, the intercepts in the CAPM regressions 
are not different from zero, while in the three-factor regressions it is positive and significant in 
the equal-weighted case.  The primary effect of weighting is to raise the coefficients on the 
  22RMRF factor, which suggests that the IPO firms reflected the overall market’s movements in a 
particularly sharp way in the late 1960s and early 1970s.   
 
  This final analysis suggests some more general thoughts about the performance of the 
pre-NASDAQ population of IPOs.  The performance patterns appear to closely reflect those of 




This paper has sought to assess the performance of IPOs by examining the period before 
the creation of NASDAQ.  By considering a period where returns of IPOs have not been 
systematically examined, we hope to shed light on whether the poor performance is driven by 
some fundamental behavioral anomaly or rather is just an idiosyncratic feature of the recent time 
period that has been the focus of prior academic studies.  Pre-NASDAQ IPOs represent a 
potentially powerful out-of-sample test of IPO underperformance.  Papers that examine IPO 
performance in other countries, as works such as Rouwenhorst (1998) highlight, may be finding 
similar patterns because of common economic factors or common investor biases across 
countries at the same time. 
 
In a sample of over 3,661 IPOs between 1935 and 1972, we find underperformance when 
event-time buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used, but even this result is not consistently 
statistically significant.  The underperformance disappears when we use cumulative abnormal 
returns.  A calendar-time analysis shows that IPOs return at least as much as the market over the 
  23entire sample period.  Finally, the intercepts in CAPM and Fama-French three-factor regressions 
are insignificantly different from or even greater than zero.  In short, the relative performance of 
IPO sample depends on the method of examining performance.  One methodology suggests that 
this sample underperforms; others suggest superior performance.   
 
Our analysis of pre-NASDAQ IPOs serves to underscore the questions about IPO 
performance raised in Brav and Gompers (1997).  The weakness of the evidence for 
underperformance and the failure to observe a consistent pattern raise doubts about whether a 
unique IPO effect indeed exists. Is there a real behavioral anomaly at work here, or rather is the 
poor performance of the offerings in the NASDAQ era simply a historical accident?  Fama 
(1998) suggests that spurious anomalies can be anticipated when stock returns are examined 
repeatedly.   
 
To be sure, it is possible that sentiment or fads are moving stock returns.  These fads or 
sentiments would have to affect a broader set of firms than just IPO firms.  Future tests of market 
efficiency need to look beyond individual anomalies and address broader market movements if 
they are to shed more light on this debate. 
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Abnormal Return Relative to Size and Book-to-Market Benchmark
Abnormal Return Relative to CRSP VW-Market Return
 
 
Figure 1.  Average annual abnormal return.  The sample is 3,661 identified IPOs from 1935 to 1972.  The equal-weighted average event-time annual abnormal 
return is plotted for years one through five after the IPO.  Abnormal returns are calculated by taking the equal-weighted average annual return on the IPOs minus the 



















































































































Figure 2.  Calendar-time returns for initial public offerings.  The sample is 3,661 identified IPOs from 1935 to 1972.  The compounded annual return on all IPOs 
in the sample that had gone public within the previous five years is compared to the compounded annual return on the CRSP value-weighted index and the average 
matched size and book-to-market benchmark return. 
 Table I 
 
Sample of Initial Public Offerings 
 
The sample is 3,661 identified IPOs from 1935 through 1972.  Panel A presents the year of the IPOs in our samples.  Panel B presents the average, median, 25
th 
percentile, and 75
th percentile rankings of market capitalization at the close of the month of the IPO (in constant 1999 dollars adjusting for the Consumer Price 
Index) and the ratio of book equity value to market equity value. 
 
Panel A: Dates of IPOs 
 
Year            1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Number  of  IPOs           
         
1 12 2 3 4 8 8 3 1 7 19 51 24 15 5 33 31 29 23
Year            1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Number  of  IPOs         
         
27 49 45 41 47 122 216 321 236 31 66 66 62 92 378 683 228 204 448
Total         





Panel B: Summary Statistics 
 
          Mean 25th  Percentile Median 75th  Percentile
Market Value  $89,089,000  $15,454,000  $31,706,000  $66,756,000 




Size and Book-to-Market Portfolio Breakdown for IPO Sample 
 
The sample is 3,661 identified IPOs from 1935 through 1972.  Size breakpoints are formed monthly by dividing all NYSE stocks into five size groups with equal 
number of firms in each group.  Book-to-market breakpoints are formed annually with equal numbers of NYSE firms allocated to each of five book-to-market 
portfolios.  The intersection of these quintile breakpoints results in 25 possible allocations.  Panel A presents the fraction of our IPO sample that is allocated to each 
size and book-to-market portfolio.  Panel B gives the average market value of the IPOs (in constant 1999 dollars) in each portfolio.  Panel C presents the average 
book-to-market ratio for our IPOs by portfolio. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of IPOs 
 
      Book-to-Market Quintile
Size  Quintile  Lowest        
           
2 3 4 Highest Total
Smallest  53.0% 16.1% 8.8% 4.6% 6.6% 89.1%
2  4.5%            1.1% 0.6% 0.4% 0.1% 6.6%
3              1.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 2.8%
4              0.7% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0%
Biggest              0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6%
Total             60.5% 17.7% 10.0% 5.1% 6.8% 100.0%
 
 
Panel B: Size by Portfolio. 
 
      Book-to-Market Quintile
Size  Quintile  Lowest     
           
2    3 4 Highest
Smallest $45,600,000 $33,700,000 $35,400,000 $28,600,000 $17,400,000
2           
         
       
       
$198,900,000 $137,600,000 $134,700,000 $140,400,000 $200,600,000
3 $378,500,000 $250,300,000 $242,300,000 $175,300,000 -
4 $812,400,000 $307,700,000 $288,000,000 - -
Biggest $5,398,200,000 $795,200,000 - - $490,800,000
 
 Table II (continued) 
 
Panel C: Book-to-Market Ratio by Portfolio. 
 
      Book-to-Market Quintile




    3 4 Highest
Smallest 0.180 0.474 0.687 0.978 2.174
2   
   
   
   
0.205 0.648 0.807 1.114 1.125
3 0.213 0.513 0.799 0.792 -
4 0.151 0.793 0.846 - -
Biggest 0.136 0.783 - - 0.732
 
 
   
Table III 
Three- and five-year post-initial public offering (IPO) buy-and-hold returns versus various 
benchmarks.   
 
The sample is 3,661 identified IPOs from 1935 through 1972.  Three- and five-year buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (both equal-weighted and value-weighted) are compared with alternative benchmarks.  In the first row  
of each panel, we employ the CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark.  Value-weighted results are 
adjusted for inflation.  Row two of each panel presents abnormal performance measured relative to attribute-
based portfolios.  Size and book-to-market portfolios are generated by first forming size quintile breakpoints 
using NYSE firms only.  These quintiles are split further into book-to-market quintiles using NYSE 
breakpoints only.  The universe of NYSE stocks is allocated into the resulting 25 portfolios and equal-
weighted monthly returns are calculated.  The breakpoints for these portfolios are recalculated annually.  Buy-
and-hold returns are generated by compounding annual returns starting in the first month that a stock price is 
found in the Bank and Quotation Record following the equity issue.  Abnormal return is the simple difference 
between IPO three- or five-year average return and the corresponding benchmark.  In Panels A and B, if the 
IPO delists before the fifth anniversary we compound the return up until the delisting year.  In Panels C and 






Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (N=3,661) 
 
 











   
BHAR 
CRSP VW index 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) 
 
8.5%  -16.7% 
(-0.73) 
6.3%  -19.9% 
(-3.63) 
Size and Book-to-Market (5x5) 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) 
8.5%  -8.4% 
(-0.52) 






Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (N=3,661) 
 
 











   
BHAR 
CRSP VW index 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) 
 
11.4%  -21.0% 
(-0.81) 
11.0%  -34.8% 
(-3.87) 
Size and Book-to-Market (5x5) 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) 
11.4%  -33.4% 
(-0.31) 
11.0%  -31.7% 
(-3.64) 
 







Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (with Spliced Data, N=3,661) 
 
 











   
BHAR 
CRSP VW index 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) 
 
11.2%  -16.1% 
(-0.75) 
8.2%  -18.6% 
(-3.05) 
Size and Book-to-Market (5x5) 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) 
11.2%   -6.3% 
(-0.40) 






Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (with Spliced Data, N=3,661) 
 
 











   
BHAR 
CRSP VW index 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) 
 
25.8%  -11.5% 
(-0.62) 
17.2%  -32.0% 
(-3.31) 
Size and Book-to-Market (5x5) 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) 
25.8%  -34.8% 
(-0.44) 
17.2%  -28.9% 
(-3.05) 
 
 Table IV 
Three- and five-year post-initial public offering (IPO) cumulative abnormal returns versus various 
benchmarks.   
 
The sample is 3,661 identified IPOs from 1935 through 1972.  Three- and five-year cumulative abnormal 
returns (both equal-weighted and value-weighted) are compared with alternative benchmarks.  In the first row 
of each panel, we employ the CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark.  Value-weighted results are 
adjusted for inflation.  Row two of each panel presents abnormal performance measured relative to attribute-
based portfolios.  Size and book-to-market portfolios are generated by first forming size quintile breakpoints 
using NYSE firms only.  These quintiles are split further into book-to-market quintiles using NYSE 
breakpoints only.  The universe of NYSE stocks is allocated into the resulting 25 portfolios and equal-
weighted monthly returns are calculated.  The breakpoints for these portfolios are recalculated annually.   
Annual returns for the IPO firms are generated by calculating annual returns starting in the first month that a 
stock price in found in the Bank and Quotation Record following the equity issue.  Abnormal return is the 
simple difference between IPO return in a given year and the designated benchmark.  Cumulative abnormal 
returns are the simple three- or five-year sum of the annual abnormal returns.  In Panels A and B, if the IPO 
delists before the fifth anniversary we compound the return up until the delisting year.  In Panels C and D, if 






Cumulative Abnormal Return (N=3,661) 
 
 
Three-Year Equal-Weighted  Three-Year Value-Weighted 
 
Benchmarks 
 CAR   
 
 CAR   
 





   2.0% 
(0.41) 
 











Cumulative Abnormal Return (n=3,661) 
 
 
Five-Year Equal-Weighted  Five-Year Value-Weighted 
 
Benchmarks 
 CAR     CAR   





   -0.5% 
(-0.10) 
 















Cumulative Abnormal Return (with Spliced Data, N=3,661) 
 
 
Three-Year Equal-Weighted  Three-Year Value-Weighted 
 
Benchmarks 
 CAR   
 
 CAR   
 





   1.3% 
(0.26) 
 











Cumulative Abnormal Return (with Spliced Data, N=3,661) 
 
 
Five-Year Equal-Weighted  Five-Year Value-Weighted 
 
Benchmarks 
 CAR     CAR   





   0.3% 
(0.06) 
 




   4.0% 
(0.79) 
 
 Table V 
Event-Time Returns on IPOs by Cohort Year 
  
The sample is 3,661 identified IPOs from 1935 through 1972.  Five-year equal-weighted buy-and-hold and cumulative abnormal returns 
are compared with alternative benchmarks in each cohort year.  We employ both the CRSP value-weighted index and an attribute-based 
portfolio as the benchmark.  Value-weighted results are adjusted for inflation.  Size and book-to-market portfolios are generated by first 
forming size quintile breakpoints using NYSE firms only.  These quintiles are split further into book-to-market quintiles using NYSE 
breakpoints only.  The universe of NYSE stocks is allocated into the resulting 25 portfolios and equal-weighted monthly returns are 
calculated.  The breakpoints for these portfolios are recalculated annually.  Annual returns for the IPO firms are generated by calculating 
annual returns starting in the first month that a stock price is found in the Bank and Quotation Record following the equity issue.  
Abnormal return is the simple difference between IPO return in a given year and the designated benchmark.  Cumulative abnormal returns 
are the simple five-year sum of the annual abnormal returns.  Buy-and-hold returns are generated by compounding annual returns.  If the 
IPO delists before the fifth anniversary we splice in the return of the matched size and book-to-market benchmark. 
  Five-Year Buy-and-Hold Returns    Five-Year Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Year  EW IPOs-EW Size and 
Book-to-Market Benchmarks 
EW IPOs- CRSP VW 
Index 
  EW IPOs-EW Size and Book-to-
Market Benchmarks 
EW IPOs- CRSP VW 
Index 
1935 67.0%  14.0%    109.1%  16.6% 
1936 157.4%  129.2%    96.0%  54.7% 
1937 -67.1%  -54.7%    -46.6%  -26.7% 
1938 58.0%  73.7%    44.0%  62.0% 
1939 -219.3%  -65.8%    -55.6%  41.2% 
1940 -212.2%  -65.1%    -105.0%  -27.6% 
1941 -59.3%  124.8%    -34.1%  64.0% 
1942 116.9%  168.6%    41.0%  105.1% 
1943 -41.3%  -45.7%    0.4% 12.9% 
1944 1.1%  -12.0%    -19.9%  -11.0% 
1945 22.0%  -32.2%    53.4%  17.8% 
1946 -44.5%  -93.5%    -6.9%  -32.4% 
1947 18.3%  -46.5%    7.7%  -30.1% 
1948 0.6%  -76.0%    4.4%  -38.8% 
1949 -19.9%  -150.3%    -13.6%  -87.1% 
1950 -24.9%  -124.6%    -18.8%  -79.4% 
1951 -45.6%  -87.9%    -29.1%  -55.7% 
1952 -28.7%  -74.1%    31.2% 4.3% 
1953 -31.8%  -4.0%    16.1%  37.1% 
1954 -43.9%  -48.9%    -47.3%  -36.1% 
1955 -54.0%  -34.9%    -35.9%  -13.5% 
1956 -36.3%  -22.9%    -30.5%  -8.3% 
1957 -36.8%  -40.7%    -13.1%  -6.1% 
1958 55.3%  21.7%    78.5%  61.4% 
1959 -33.8%  -38.9%    -0.1% 0.6% 
1960 -25.4%  13.6%    29.6%  60.2% 
1961 -222.4%  -53.4%    -63.8%  21.1% 
1962 -209.7%  31.1%    -78.3%  37.9% 
1963 245.2%  467.0%    41.1%  158.9% 
1964 104.1%  181.6%    39.9%  134.3% 
1965 53.4%  92.6%    32.8%  93.0% 
1966 612.0%  622.6%    473.2%  503.3% 
1967 41.3%  -23.8%    134.8%  67.5% 
1968 32.3%  -22.7%    76.3%  -1.1% 
1969 -24.0%  -71.6%    -19.9%  -62.4% 
1970 -11.0%  -48.9%    -7.2%  -29.5% 
1971 -17.1%  -39.2%    -2.8% -7.3% 
1972 -77.5%  -3.9%    -60.4%  3.8% 
          
Average 0.0% 14.7%    16.3%  26.4% 
t-statistic (0.00)  (0.61)    (1.09)  (1.68) 
 Table VI 
Calendar-time Returns on IPOs 
 
The sample is 3,661 identified IPOs from 1935 through 1972.  The annual abnormal returns (both equal-weighted and value-weighted) 
are compared with alternative benchmarks in each year.  Each year, the return on all IPOs in the sample that went public within the past 
five years is calculated.  The returns are either equally weighted or weighted by market capitalization at IPO (in constant 1999 dollars).  
The annual benchmark returns are the annual returns on either the CRSP value-weighted index or the matched size and book-to-market 
index.  The final column presents the annual excess return on small, low book-to-market non-issuing firms relative to the CRSP value-
weighted index.   
Year  EW IPOs- CRSP 
VW Index  
VW IPOs - CRSP 
VW Index 
EW IPOs-EW Size and Book-
to-Market Benchmarks 
VW IPOs- VW Size and 
Book-to-Market Benchmarks  
Excess Return on 
(1,1) Portfolio 
1936  -46.4% -46.4% -37.5% -37.5%  -6.8%
1937  10.7% 1.5% 35.8% 19.0% -32.2%
1938  -1.3% -6.1% -12.1% -20.1%  4.9%
1939  28.8% 48.3% 34.2% 45.4%  -17.8%
1940  17.2% 14.3% 19.2% 9.4%  -7.1%
1941  1.1% 2.7% 18.4% 7.2% -45.3%
1942  -6.7% 3.5% -15.1% 1.2%  7.8%
1943  25.9% 14.8% -0.8% 9.4%  9.3%
1944  8.6% 19.1% -22.9% 15.5%  50.8%
1945  50.8% 30.8% 8.4% 22.1%  50.3%
1946  -4.4% -11.2% -1.1% -6.2%  2.5%
1947  -8.8% -9.3% -0.5% -5.3%  -8.9%
1948  -6.0% -8.6% 3.7% -2.4%  -8.1%
1949  8.0% 7.0% 12.0% 6.2% -12.8%
1950  -3.2% -3.1% -8.2% -15.0%  -0.6%
1951  -4.2% -5.5% 1.2% -1.6%  -2.5%
1952  -7.8% -25.2% 6.0% -20.8%  -27.3%
1953  -6.8% -10.2% 1.3% -10.4%  -16.7%
1954  -21.7% -22.1% -20.6% -23.2%  -14.5%
1955  -2.1% -6.2% 5.6% -6.1%  -13.8%
1956  -11.6% -14.1% -3.7% -11.6%  -13.6%
1957  0.2% -2.5% 0.8% -3.8%  -2.1%
1958  -2.3% -8.5% -50.4% -27.4%  70.8%
1959  8.3% -9.6% 2.3% -17.3%  -1.0%
1960  4.1% 28.6% 16.8% 29.8%  -20.0%
1961  5.3% 15.1% 1.7% 14.0%  3.4%
1962  -29.3% -15.6% -22.3% -9.4%  -7.6%
1963  -8.4% 12.7% -23.5% 7.5%  23.5%
1964  7.1% -7.7% 3.7% -12.0%  2.9%
1965  52.5% 21.3% 24.1% 12.1%  27.2%
1966  9.7% 11.0% 0.3% 8.9%  10.8%
1967  109.7% -12.3% 15.8% -34.0%  115.3%
1968  47.9% 38.4% 13.2% 12.7%  31.1%
1969  -1.8% -6.8% 12.8% 2.8%  -15.1%
1970  -29.4% -26.8% -6.2% -7.9%  -28.2%
1971  19.6% 11.9% 8.5% -0.9%  12.7%
1972  -9.8% -6.8% 6.4% 6.1%  -17.3%
1973  -20.3% -22.9% 1.2% -3.2%  -24.7%
1974  -1.9% -5.6% -4.3% -6.5%  0.9%
1975  30.9% 44.7% -4.3% 13.1%  31.5%
1976  13.1% 13.3% -9.2% -6.1  21.8%
Average Annual 
Abnormal Return  5.5% 1.1% 0.3% -1.1%  3.3%
Median Annual 
Abnormal Return  -1.3%  -5.5% 1.2% -2.4%  -2.1%
t-statistic  (1.34) (0.10) (0.10) (0.43) 
 Table VII 
Correlation between Calendar-time IPO Returns and Number of IPOs in Calendar-time Portfolio 
 
The sample is 3,661 identified IPOs from 1935 through 1972.  The correlation coefficient between the annual abnormal return of the IPOs (both equal-weighted 
and value-weighted) relative to the matched size and book-to-market benchmarks and the CRSP value-weighted index in each year and the number of IPOs in the 
annual portfolio is calculated.  Each year, the return on all IPOs in the sample that went public within the past five years is calculated.  The returns are either 
equally weighted or weighted by market capitalization at IPO (in constant 1999 dollars).  The annual benchmark returns are the annual returns on either the 
CRSP value-weighted index or the matched size and book-to-market index. 
 
 EW IPOs-EW Size 
and Book-to-Market 
Benchmarks 
VW IPOs -VW Size 
and Book-to-Market 
Benchmarks 
EW IPOs- CRSP VW 
index 
VW IPOs- CRSP VW 
index 
Number of IPOs in 
Portfolio 
 









0.501 0.294 1.000 EW IPOs- CRSP 
VW index  (0.001) (0.089)
 
0.416 0.820 0.590 1.000 VW IPOs- CRSP 
VW index  (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
 
-0.015 0.030 -0.143 -0.098 1.000 Number of IPOs in 
Portfolio  (0.928) (0.852) (0.171) (0.340)
 
  Table VIII 
CAPM and Fama-French (1993) three factor regression on initial public offering (IPO) portfolios  
 
The sample is 3,661 identified IPOs from 1935 through 1972.  Portfolios of IPOs include all issues that were 
completed within the previous five years.  RMRF is the value-weighted market return on all NYSE stocks (RM) 
minus the risk free rate (RF), which is the one-month Treasury bill rate.  SMB (small minus big) is the difference 
each month between the return on small firms and big firms.  HML (high minus low) is the difference each month 
between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market 
stocks.  The first two columns present results for the CAPM regressions.  The next two columns present Fama-
French three factor regressions (t-statistics are in parentheses).  Panel A estimates ordinary least squares regressions 
while Panel B uses weighted least squares where observations are weighted by the square root of the number of IPO 
firms in the portfolio in a given year. 
 



















































0.449 0.541  0.824  0.669 
 



















































0.548 0.666  0.891  0.757 
 
 